Bridging the Gap: Clarifying Communication for Regulatory Authorities

Never did I anticipate the need to craft a discourse on the foundational principles of communication, ones that underpin the intricate processes of news reporting and advertising. This discourse is vital for budding communication and journalism students in their initial year. Yet, contemporary applications of Lithuania’s Law on Advertising indicate that unless we reintegrate precise communication theory into the legal framework, regulatory bodies may exploit ambiguous language within the law and nebulous concepts of communication processes, potentially curbing media freedom.

Surprisingly, the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority has issued warnings to media outlets for engaging in disguised advertising under the Law on Advertising. These warnings were triggered by the publication of press releases featuring exclusive interviews with representatives of single business organizations. Such incidents left many baffled, as press releases are widely recognized as instruments of public relations, distinct from advertising tools.

To the uninitiated, advertising and public relations may seem indistinguishable. Nevertheless, a lack of clarity and legal confusion has led to the imposition of media freedom restrictions, ostensibly intended to protect consumers from deceptive advertising.

Communication theory meticulously distinguishes advertising from public relations. Advertising involves compensated information conveyed through various media forms, whether text, imagery, or sound. Advertisers exercise control over space, timing, content, and more.

Conversely, public relations encompasses the process through which individuals or entities, private or legal, provide information to the media for integration into the news production process. Journalists and editors retain the discretion to determine the quantity and type of information used. This news production process is safeguarded by the principles of media freedom.

By communication theory, a press release serves as a public relations tool, subject to the editorial discretion of media outlets. Media institutions adhere to ethical codes and employ self-regulatory mechanisms to uphold news quality, including the utilization of multiple sources for a given issue. Any interference in the news production process constitutes a breach of media freedom.

Therefore, communication theory offers unambiguous definitions of advertising and public relations communication, preserving the delineation between media as autonomous institutions for news presentation and media as enterprises capable of maintaining independence through advertising revenue.

The current Law on Advertising and its interpretations blur the lines between advertising communication and news delivery, enabling regulatory bodies like the Consumer Rights Protection Authority to intervene in the news production process, which should be shielded by principles of media freedom. A robust democracy relies on an unfettered media, and any encroachment on this freedom jeopardizes it.

In my view, it is high time to initiate discussions on a new Law on Advertising, one that distinctly defines advertising and the provision of news and information. This is especially crucial given that the legal confusion extends beyond advertising, impacting other regulatory bodies, such as the Drug, Tobacco, and Alcohol Regulatory Department. They categorize any information as advertising, limiting consumer access to valuable information—a task supposedly undertaken by the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority.

What motivates you to buy – information or advertising?

Subsequently, I received inquiries about my reservations regarding the criterion “if it encourages you to buy, it is advertising,” a criterion also used in Lithuanian case law.

Primarily, our purchasing motivations are highly individualistic. Hence, this criterion is inherently subjective, akin to assessing attractiveness. Such subjective criteria in law and case law leave businesses susceptible to arbitrary interpretations by regulatory bodies.

Consider these examples: A press release from a publicly traded company announcing robust annual results is likely to influence stock prices, potentially motivating some investors to buy shares, even if such intentions aren’t explicitly stated. Yet, by communication theory, this does not constitute advertising. However, under the Lithuanian criterion, it might be classified as advertising—an absurdity for those involved in investor relations.

Now, ponder non-press release information. After the Fukushima nuclear power plant incident in Japan, Lithuanian media reports prompted a rush on iodized salt. Is this information advertising? Clearly not, though it prompted buying. Categorizing it as advertising under the “if it encourages you to buy” principle would be nonsensical.

Consider the National Drama Theatre’s “Don’t go to the theatre” advertisement. Why is it deemed advertising when it dissuades purchases? Some might argue it doesn’t fit the criterion. Professionals, however, unanimously consider it advertising, with effectiveness being a separate discussion.

Lastly, is advertising for alcohol-free beer also advertising for alcoholic beer? The debate rages on. Hence, advertising law should adhere to communication theory’s clear definitions, avoiding unnecessary complexity.

Artūras Jonkus, Chairman of the Board of the The Association of Communication Industry, Head of Salve Agency